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### Background FE sends query fragments to BE using gRPC/BRPC. BE retrieves lazy external scan splits from FE over Thrift. OSS implementations expose TLS provider interfaces, while their private clients use plaintext and their servers reject TLS activation. ### What problem does this PR solve? Issue Number: None Related PR: apache#70675 (separate encrypted table/cache ownership hardening) PR Type: Enhancement Problem Summary: OSS deployments need authenticated, encrypted internal RPC before transporting private file-key descriptors. Implement mutual TLS for fragment channels and blocking Thrift clients/listeners, using the existing TLS configuration and explicit protocol exclusions. Preserve the original certified hostname after DNS resolution, keep reconnects encrypted, and bound authentication IO independently of normal RPC read timeouts. Connection and server lifecycle tests also cover failed initialization and repeated cleanup. ### Details - **Change map:** 930 changed production lines, 802 test/fixture lines, 97 documentation lines, and no generated files. Native TLS setup and bounded sockets live in `private_rpc_tls`; Java contexts and Thrift transports live in `tls`; OSS providers select them, and the shared Thrift server accepts a provider listener. Tests use ephemeral OpenSSL identities and real listeners. - **Before and after:** Included private protocols now require a trusted peer certificate and encrypt their traffic. Authentication failures propagate to callers. Java and native Thrift reconnects retain TLS, and a peer that stalls before authentication cannot inherit an unlimited RPC idle timeout. Cleanup handles servers whose TLS validation failed before start, as well as a server already joined during explicit shutdown. - **Configs and defaults:** `enable_tls=false` stays the default. Private TLS requires `verify_fail_if_no_peer_cert`, certificate/key/CA files, static refresh interval zero, and a positive Thrift connect timeout. Unsupported SAN allowlists and BE private-key passwords are rejected. See `docs/private-rpc-tls.md` for public-protocol exclusions, certificate rotation and dedicated-cluster-CA requirements. Native BRPC clients authenticate the configured CA trust domain; FE gRPC and Thrift clients additionally verify the target hostname/IP. - **Impact on existing users:** Default plaintext deployments keep their transport behavior. Operators can opt into OSS private RPC mutual TLS with coordinated node configuration. Existing encrypted Iceberg SQL capability/admission checks remain in place. ### Testing Local verification used the transport patch together with the separate cache/lifetime hardening in apache#70675. All 17 transport files are identical on this independent PR branch, and their preimages are unchanged by that cache patch. - Local repository `run-fe-ut.sh`: 11 tests passed, including real gRPC/Thrift authentication, hostname and CA rejection, plaintext control, reconnects in both transport modes, and stalled-handshake cleanup. - Local repository `run-be-ut.sh`: 158 ASAN tests in 11 suites passed, including 11 TLS tests and native encrypted Parquet/data/delete/cancellation cases. New lifecycle tests reproduced null cleanup and repeated-join failures before the fixes; stalled-peer tests failed before bounded authentication was added. - Full ASAN `build.sh --be --fe` passed with FE Checkstyle; clang-format 16, header hygiene and clang-tidy passed on the affected C++ files. The shipped BE ELF has no GLIBC requirement newer than 2.17. - An isolated local FE/BE cluster completed authenticated heartbeats, a BE fragment query returning count 100 and sum 4950, an HMS data scan returning IDs 1–4, and a lazy V2 delete scan returning 1,3,4,6,8. The FE `fetchSplitBatch` RPC counter confirmed BE-to-FE split fetches. - All four live private RPC endpoints accepted trusted identities and rejected missing/untrusted identities, wrong CA, wrong hostname and plaintext. Trusted connections succeeded again after rejection checks. - Independent SDK 1.12.0 and Spark reference reads agreed on historical snapshots with real encrypted manifests, manifest lists and file keys. Default encrypted SQL still rejected admission with `READ_DISABLED`. ### Release note OSS deployments can enable mutual TLS for internal gRPC/BRPC and blocking Thrift using the existing TLS settings. Private RPC mutual authentication, static certificate configuration and explicit exclusions for unsupported public protocols are required. The default remains disabled. ### Check List (For Author) - Behavior changed: Yes (see Details) - Does this need documentation: Yes; operator and trust-boundary notes are included in `docs/private-rpc-tls.md`. - Pre-submission status: Ready for transport review; encrypted SQL capability negotiation and broader encrypted-read acceptance are separate work. ### AI Disclosure - Tool: Codex (GPT-6) - Generated: Implementation, tests, fixture script, documentation and this description. - Human review: Pending maintainer review; agent self-review and local verification completed.
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Request changes for three verified integration defects: native Thrift loses the original DNS identity (P1), RPC function validation and execution select incompatible transports (P2), and broker heartbeat and filesystem clients select incompatible transports (P2). All three are reported inline.
Review converged in 2 rounds at head 6624a82. The native, Java and separate risk reviewers all returned NO_NEW_VALUABLE_FINDINGS in round 2. All 17 changed files, upstream/downstream callers, candidates and initial risks have dispositions. No existing inline threads or blocking comment IDs were present. No additional user focus was supplied.
Critical checkpoint conclusions:
- Goal and proof: provider/listener changes implement opt-in private mutual TLS; transport-local tests cover intended behavior, but miss the three production integrations reported inline.
- Scope and reuse: changes are focused on existing provider boundaries, socket wrappers, lifecycle fixes, tests and operator documentation.
- Concurrency: accepted sockets authenticate on existing request workers; pool ownership and existing server/session locks remain. No additional lock-order defect found.
- Lifecycle and static initialization: factory/socket ownership, failed initialization, repeated cleanup and TLS reconnect paths were traced; no additional defect or new static-initialization dependency found.
- Configuration: existing settings are reused; default TLS-off behavior is retained. Positive handshake timeouts are snapshotted; static identities require restart.
- Compatibility: no payload/storage-format change. TLS activation requires coordinated nodes, as documented; external function and broker compatibility gaps are inline.
- Thrift/protobuf IDs: no gensrc definition changes; branch field-ID comparison is not applicable.
- Parallel paths: both Thrift directions, FE gRPC and native BRPC were traced. The external function and broker paths need consistent policy. Public/cloud exclusions and native BRPC CA-domain trust are explicit limits.
- Conditional checks: timeout, closed-socket, EINTR and partial-cleanup branches have concrete rationale; no additional branch defect found.
- Test coverage: inspected trusted/untrusted identities, wrong host/CA, plaintext controls, framed/raw reconnect, real listeners, stalled authentication and cleanup tests. Add production-cache DNS-only, RPC function and broker-pool coexistence cases for the findings.
- Expected results: no golden result files changed. Test identities are generated ephemerally with restrictive permissions.
- Observability: existing RPC/connection/latency counters remain; new errors propagate without exposing key input. No added hot-path INFO logging.
- Transaction and persistence: no edit-log or transaction changes; not applicable.
- Data writes and atomicity: transport payload processing is unchanged; no new storage mutation, visibility or delete-bitmap logic.
- FE/BE variables: no new transmitted fields; participating nodes configure TLS independently.
- Performance and memory: contexts reparse identities per new connection/channel, amortized by pools; optimization opportunity recorded, with no measured performance claim or additional verified bug.
- Other risks: pooled DNS identity was checked through the actual coordinator/cache path. All source candidates are resolved or deduplicated; no remaining source coverage gap.
Validation was static inspection only. No builds, tests, benchmarks, runtime interoperability checks or final ELF/glibc audits were run; the PR author's reported results were not independently reproduced.
Review converged after 2 round(s).
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No new actionable findings at head 42f3756. The three existing issues are addressed: native Thrift retains the logical DNS identity through initial creation and reopen (4599498057); external function validation and execution retain compatible plaintext transports (4599498389); and FE/BE broker heartbeats and filesystem clients share the external-service policy (4599498778). None remains an independently confirmed P0/P1 blocker, so no existing blocking comment IDs are carried forward and no duplicate inline comments are added.
The review converged in 1 round. The backend, frontend and separate risk reviewers all returned NO_NEW_VALUABLE_FINDINGS. All 29 changed files, production callers, candidates and initial risks were reviewed and have dispositions. No additional user focus was supplied.
Critical checkpoint conclusions:
- Goal and proof: the OSS provider paths implement opt-in mutual TLS for private gRPC/BRPC and blocking Thrift. Inspected tests exercise authentication, rejection, reconnect and the production compatibility paths; runtime success was not independently reproduced.
- Scope and reuse: TLS setup is centralized behind existing providers; changes are focused on transports, compatibility adapters, lifecycle fixes, fixtures and operator documentation.
- Concurrency and locks: handshakes run on connection/request workers using socket-local state; existing cache synchronization and exclusive pool borrowing remain. No new lock-order defect or heavy operation added inside a cache lock was found.
- Lifecycle and initialization: factory/socket ownership, lazy authentication, failure cleanup, reconnect, unstarted servers and repeated joins were traced. No new ownership cycle or cross-translation-unit static initialization dependency was found.
- Configuration: existing TLS settings are reused, with default-off behavior preserved. Mutable handshake timeouts are snapshotted and validated; static identities, unsupported settings and restart requirements are documented.
- Compatibility: original provider entry points and Java subclass dispatch remain effective. TLS activation requires coordinated nodes; no automatic plaintext/TLS rolling transition or storage-format change is promised.
- Thrift/protobuf IDs: no gensrc definitions changed; release-branch ID comparison is not applicable.
- Parallel paths: traced FE gRPC, native BRPC, both Thrift directions, cached/uncached function clients and broker clients/reopen. Public-protocol exclusions, native BRPC CA-domain trust and incomplete cloud control-plane coverage are explicit feature limits.
- Conditions: timeout, peer-identity restoration, external-purpose routing, closed-socket and partial-cleanup branches have concrete rationale; no additional faulty branch was established.
- Tests: inspected trusted/untrusted identities, wrong hostname/CA, missing certificates, plaintext controls, raw/framed reopen, real listeners, stalled authentication, DNS-only native cache/reuse/reopen, broker coexistence, function execution and legacy-provider override assertions. These are not an independently executed cross-language acceptance run.
- Expected results: no golden result files changed. The fixture generates temporary short-lived identities with restrictive permissions; test assertions were inspected for consistency.
- Observability and errors: existing RPC/connection/latency metrics remain. Initialization and authentication failures propagate without plaintext fallback; classified messages avoid exposing key input. No added hot-path INFO logging was found.
- Transactions and persistence: no journal, replay, transaction or failover protocol changes; not applicable.
- Data writes and atomicity: transport setup does not alter storage mutations, visible versions or delete bitmaps. Socket and listener failure cleanup was reviewed separately.
- FE/BE variables: no new transmitted fields; participating processes configure TLS independently.
- Performance and memory: identity parsing occurs on new connections/channels and pools reuse authenticated sockets. No large new query allocation, per-request identity parsing or demonstrated material performance defect was found. BE header/include changes add no PCH, explicit-instantiation or source-inclusion test changes.
- Other risks and final sweep: all changed paths and risk dispositions were rechecked; no unresolved source candidate remains. The prior findings were verified against current code and refreshed GitHub context before delivery.
Validation and limits: static inspection only. No builds, tests, benchmarks, live interoperability checks or final ELF/glibc audits were run, and author-reported results were not independently reproduced. Out-of-tree custom TLS implementations are absent; compatibility was assessed at the preserved provider symbols and dispatch boundaries. No remaining coverage gap was identified within the changed in-tree source scope.
Review converged after 1 round(s).
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Fixed the FE UT fixture failure in b66b466. With the CI-style PATH, the prebuilt OpenSSL executable exits 127 because its shared libraries are missing. The generator now retains a working configured CLI and falls back to the system search path only when necessary. The original fixture reproduced exit 127; both PATH variants now generate valid identities, and all 20 targeted FE tests pass with no failures or skips. This update changes only the certificate-generation script; transport behavior and test assertions are unchanged. |
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One new P2 finding: native TLS socket initialization can throw before the client cache's exception-to-Status boundary, allowing a background report connection failure to terminate BE. The verified scenario and fix direction are inline.
The three existing findings are fixed at this head: original DNS identity survives native cache creation/reopen (4599498057); external RPC function validation/execution retain compatible plaintext policy (4599498389); and FE/BE broker heartbeat/filesystem clients use the same external-service policy (4599498778). No existing P0/P1 finding remains independently confirmed, so no blocking IDs are carried forward and no duplicate comments are added. No additional user focus was supplied.
Review converged in 2 rounds at head b66b466. All 29 changed files, related callers, initial risks and candidates have dispositions. The BE, FE and separate lifecycle reviewers returned NO_NEW_VALUABLE_FINDINGS in the final round after challenging the frozen finding and summary.
Critical checkpoint conclusions:
- Goal and proof: existing OSS providers implement opt-in mutual TLS for private gRPC/BRPC and blocking Thrift. Inspected tests cover successful and rejected connections; the construction-failure path needs cache-level negative coverage.
- Scope and reuse: changes are focused on centralized TLS setup, provider dispatch, socket wrappers, listener integration, compatibility tests, fixtures and operator documentation.
- Concurrency and locks: TLS state is socket-local under exclusive pool borrowing or request-worker ownership. Cache synchronization remains; native connection authentication occurs outside its map insertion lock. No new lock-order defect was established.
- Lifecycle and initialization: factory/socket ownership, inherited Java streams, failure cleanup, reconnect, unstarted servers and repeated shutdown were traced. The uncaught client-construction exception is reported inline; no additional ownership cycle or static-initialization dependency was found.
- Configuration: existing default-off TLS settings are reused. Static identities and unsupported options require documented operator coordination/restart. Positive handshake timeouts are snapshotted, but accepted mutable timeout updates and later PEM failures can trigger the inline defect.
- Compatibility: legacy provider symbols and Java subclass dispatch remain effective. Activation requires coordinated nodes; automatic mixed plaintext/TLS transition and complete cloud control-plane coverage are documented feature limits.
- Thrift/protobuf IDs: no generated definitions changed; release-branch field-ID comparison is not applicable.
- Parallel paths: traced FE gRPC, native BRPC, both Thrift directions, cache/reopen, cached/uncached function channels and FE/BE brokers. Earlier endpoint-policy mismatches are fixed. Public-protocol exclusions and native BRPC CA-domain trust are explicit limits.
- Conditions: peer-identity restoration, purpose dispatch, timeout bounds, closed-socket handling, EINTR and partial-cleanup branches have concrete rationale. No additional faulty conditional was established.
- Tests: inspected real listeners, trusted/untrusted/missing identities, wrong CA/hostname, plaintext controls, raw/framed reconnect, stalled authentication, cleanup, DNS-only native cache/reuse/reopen, function/broker coexistence and legacy overrides. Failed TLS construction through the actual native cache/report path is not covered.
- Expected results: no golden result files changed. The fixture generates temporary short-lived identities under umask 077; assertions and OpenSSL executable fallback were inspected.
- Observability and errors: existing connection/RPC/latency metrics remain and messages redact identity input. Authentication failures do not fall back to plaintext. Initialization errors must also reach normal RPC status/reporting as described inline.
- Transactions and persistence: no journal, replay, metadata-persistence or transaction/failover protocol change; not applicable.
- Data writes and atomicity: transport setup does not change storage mutations, visible versions or delete bitmaps. Error-path process availability is covered by the finding.
- FE/BE variables: no new transmitted fields; participating processes configure TLS independently.
- Performance and memory: contexts parse identities per connection/channel and existing pools reuse authenticated connections. No measured performance claim or material hot-loop allocation defect was established. No PCH, gate-table, explicit-instantiation or test source-inclusion changes require separate findings.
- Other risks and final sweep: DNS identity, pinned-library handshake semantics, listener handoff, accepted-socket casts, timeout restoration and cleanup were rechecked. Every source candidate is accepted, dismissed with evidence or deduplicated; no unresolved in-tree source question remains.
Validation and limits: static inspection only. No builds, tests, benchmarks, live interoperability checks or final ELF/glibc audits were run; author-reported results were not independently reproduced. Out-of-tree TLS implementations are absent, so compatibility was assessed at preserved provider signatures and dispatch boundaries. No unresolved candidate remains within the reviewed in-tree source scope.
Review converged after 2 round(s).
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Static review of all 29 changed paths at cd9f1ae7ca1da02ac6a1694572f840b81529b7d7. One new P2 finding: BRPC TLS configuration failure can escape a cache lookup as a raw Status and terminate a BE worker. The implementation otherwise supports the stated private-RPC transport scope on inspection.
Critical checkpoint conclusions:
- Goal and proof: OSS internal BRPC/gRPC and blocking Thrift use mutual TLS, preserve logical peer names where supported, and retain TLS on reconnect. Real-listener and real-cache tests cover the main success/failure paths in source. The BRPC configuration-failure case in the inline finding lacks coverage.
- Scope and reuse: Changes stay within transport providers, purpose selection, lifecycle support, tests, fixtures and operator documentation. Original provider entry points are reused for custom implementations.
- Concurrency and locks: New handshake/timeout state is connection-owned. Existing cache locks protect publication; native connection construction runs outside the map lock. FE channel construction retains its existing creation lock. No new lock ordering or deadlock was identified; the uncaught worker error is reported inline.
- Lifecycle and initialization: Factory/socket ownership, failed open, unstarted-server cleanup, repeated join, accepted-socket cleanup and reconnect were traced. No new ownership cycle or cross-translation-unit initialization dependency was found.
- Configuration: No keys are added. Restart-scoped TLS identity/policy, static refresh requirements, protocol exclusions and positive snapshotted handshake timeouts match the documentation. Loss of an identity file during operation triggers the BRPC defect.
- Compatibility: TLS remains off by default. Native and Java legacy provider dispatch is preserved, and external broker/function clients retain plaintext consistently. TLS activation requires coordinated deployment; a rolling plaintext/TLS transition and complete cloud control-plane TLS are explicitly outside this provider's scope.
- Generated definitions: No Thrift/protobuf definitions or field IDs change; cross-branch field-ID comparison is not applicable.
- Parallel paths: Cached/uncached BRPC, both native Thrift constructors, FE frontend/backend/heartbeat pools, framed/nonframed reconnect, DNS resolution and excluded public protocols were checked. Earlier endpoint-policy defects are fixed.
- Conditional checks: New conditions correspond to protocol selection, known unsupported modes, endpoint purpose, failed initialization or repeated cleanup and have concrete explanatory comments.
- Test coverage: Inspected native/Java tests cover trusted and rejected identities, wrong hostname/CA, plaintext rejection and default-off behavior, actual heartbeat/split/broker/function calls, DNS-only identity, reconnect, stalled authentication and Thrift construction-failure recovery. No builds or tests were executed in this review.
- Changed results: No golden/result files change. Added assertions and ephemeral certificate-generation behavior were inspected; reported author test/build outcomes were not independently reproduced.
- Observability: Existing RPC/connection metrics and failure logging remain, setup diagnostics are redacted, and no new per-RPC INFO logging was introduced. The inline defect bypasses the intended RPC failure-reporting path.
- Persistence and failover: No EditLog, transaction, persisted metadata or master-failover logic changes.
- Data writes and core invariants: No write/commit atomicity, visible-version or delete-bitmap semantics change. Transport cleanup was inspected for leaks and deadlocks; none was substantiated beyond the reported process-failure path.
- FE/BE variables: No new transmitted variables or payload layouts need propagation across send paths.
- Performance: Certificate/context creation occurs on connection/channel creation and is amortized by existing reuse. No substantiated per-message parsing, redundant scan or new hot-path regression was found. No benchmarks were run.
- Other checks and limits: CMake source/provider selection and header ownership were inspected. Final ELF GLIBC compatibility, full builds, runtime integration and optional out-of-tree provider implementations were not verified in this static-only environment.
Previous review context: independently confirmed the native DNS identity fix (4599498057), external function policy fix (4599498389), broker transport consistency fix (4599498778), and Thrift construction-to-Status fix (4603889850). They are not repeated. No existing P0/P1 finding remains applicable. The new finding concerns the separate BRPC cache and a concrete classic-mode Variant schema-fetch worker.
User focus: no additional focus was supplied. All assigned file coverage, candidate dispositions and initial risk questions have been completed; no unresolved review question remains within the static scope.
Review converged after 2 round(s).
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Static review of 78bb92f4984012f8c508e0f413320b487a1d2449: no new reportable findings. All 29 changed files, related invocation paths, tests, fixture and operator documentation were inspected. The three assigned reviewers returned NO_NEW_VALUABLE_FINDINGS; all four initial risk focuses and follow-up candidates have evidence-backed dispositions. The review converged in one round.
Existing review context was independently checked against this head. The original P1 DNS-identity issue (4599498057) is repaired: the cache retains the registered hostname through resolved-IP connection setup and reopen. The P2 external-function policy (4599498389), broker policy (4599498778), Thrift construction exception boundary (4603889850), and BRPC configuration failure boundary (4604266482) are also repaired. No existing P0/P1 remains confirmed as applicable, and no duplicate inline comments are added. The supplied user-focus file contains no additional focus points.
Critical checkpoint conclusions:
- Goal and evidence: Internal BRPC/gRPC and blocking Thrift providers select mutual TLS when enabled, with authenticated reconnects and explicit unsupported-mode failures. Tests cover real listeners and cache/pool paths; their source was inspected, not executed.
- Scope and reuse: Changes remain focused on transport providers, cache error handling, socket/server lifecycle, tests and deployment guidance. Existing provider interfaces and cache contracts are reused.
- Concurrency and locks: Per-connection authentication runs on request workers; the serial accept loop does not perform it. Cache publication remains protected, native context/file setup occurs outside cache-map locks, and existing FE proxy construction locking remains. No new lock-order cycle was identified.
- Lifecycle and initialization: Native socket ownership retains its factory through destruction; failed acquisition does not publish a client. FE reservation handoff releases the original listener before TLS binding. Failed startup and repeated native shutdown/join are handled. No new production static-initialization dependency was identified.
- Configuration: Existing TLS settings are reused. Unsupported refresh/verification/SAN/password combinations fail explicitly; connect-timeout values are validated and captured for authentication. Identity refresh requires the documented restart.
- Compatibility: Default plaintext and legacy provider entry points remain. Enabling TLS requires coordinated node configuration; a rolling plaintext/TLS transition is explicitly outside the implementation's contract. Unshipped custom-provider implementations were not available for inspection.
- Generated protocols: No
gensrc/thriftorgensrc/protodefinitions changed; no field-ID or wire-schema migration applies. - Parallel paths: Cached/uncached internal BRPC, Thrift acquisition/reopen, blocking listener variants and FE channel creation were traced. External RPC-function and broker paths preserve their matching plaintext policies. Broader cloud control-plane transports are not claimed as covered by this feature.
- Conditionals: Added transport selection, timeout, failure and cleanup branches have concrete rationale. Nonblocking TLS listener modes reject explicitly.
- Test coverage: Inspected positive and negative trust/hostname tests, plaintext controls, reconnect/cache reuse, failed construction and recovery, stalled authentication, listener cleanup, external endpoint compatibility and legacy provider dispatch tests. Cross-language cluster execution remains author-reported.
- Test results: No regression golden outputs changed. This review does not independently attest to the test/build results listed in the PR description.
- Observability: Existing provider/startup logs, RPC counters and latency recording remain. Generic transport-setup diagnostics intentionally avoid exposing identity/parser inputs; no additional required metric was established.
- Transactions and persistence: No transaction, EditLog or metadata persistence logic changed; related failover checks are not applicable.
- Data writes and correctness invariants: No rowset, visible-version, delete-bitmap or atomic data-write logic changed. Transport failure propagation and ownership were reviewed; no new correctness defect was established.
- FE/BE variable passing: No new query/session variables or serialized fields require propagation across additional send paths.
- Performance: Certificate/context work occurs on connection creation rather than ordinary cache hits. No substantiated new hot-path performance defect was identified.
- Additional recheck: Rechecked inherited Thrift behavior against the pinned dependency, original-host restoration, buffered message limits, null-client callers, listener handoff and custom-provider source selection. No unresolved candidate remains.
Validation limits: this was static review only. No builds, tests, fixture generation, cluster execution, formatting/static-analysis commands or final ELF/GLIBC audit were run. The documented coordinated activation, static identities and transport coverage limits still apply.
Review converged after 1 round(s).
Background
FE sends query fragments to BE using gRPC/BRPC. BE retrieves lazy external scan splits from FE over Thrift. OSS implementations expose TLS provider interfaces, while their private clients use plaintext and their servers reject TLS activation.
What problem does this PR solve?
Issue Number: None
Related PR: #70675 (separate encrypted table/cache ownership hardening)
PR Type: Enhancement
Problem Summary:
OSS deployments need authenticated, encrypted internal RPC before transporting private file-key descriptors. Implement mutual TLS for fragment channels and blocking Thrift clients/listeners, using the existing TLS configuration and explicit protocol exclusions. Preserve the original certified hostname after DNS resolution, keep reconnects encrypted, and bound authentication IO independently of normal RPC read timeouts. Connection and server lifecycle tests also cover failed initialization and repeated cleanup.
Details
private_rpc_tls; Java contexts and Thrift transports live intls; OSS providers select them. Tests use ephemeral OpenSSL identities and real listeners.enable_tls=falsestays the default. Private TLS requiresverify_fail_if_no_peer_cert, certificate/key/CA files, static refresh interval zero, and a positive Thrift connect timeout. Unsupported SAN allowlists and BE private-key passwords are rejected. Seedocs/private-rpc-tls.mdfor public-protocol exclusions, certificate rotation and dedicated-cluster-CA requirements. Native BRPC clients authenticate the configured CA trust domain; FE gRPC and Thrift clients additionally verify the target hostname/IP.Testing
Validation on this independent transport branch:
run-fe-ut.sh: 20 tests passed, including real gRPC/Thrift authentication, hostname/CA rejection, plaintext controls, reconnects, stalled-handshake cleanup, the actual broker heartbeat/filesystem clients, and legacy provider override compatibility.run-be-ut.sh: 175 ASAN tests in 13 suites passed, including 16 TLS tests, encrypted Parquet/data/delete/cancellation cases, client-cache checks and remote cancellation tests. The new DNS-only certificate test exercises actual split fetches through the resolved native cache, reconnect and reuse, and rejects a different hostname mapped to the same IP. Real plaintext external function and broker servers remain reachable with private TLS enabled.build.sh --bepassed for the final native sources. The ASAN FE/BE integration build passed with zero FE Checkstyle violations. clang-format 16, header hygiene and clang-tidy passed on affected C++ files. The shipped BE ELF's maximum GLIBC requirement is 2.10, below the 2.17 compatibility ceiling.fetchSplitBatchcounter confirmed BE-to-FE split fetches. Encrypted SQL admission remains closed pending separate capability and acceptance work.Release note
OSS deployments can enable mutual TLS for internal gRPC/BRPC and blocking Thrift using the existing TLS settings. Private RPC mutual authentication, static certificate configuration and explicit exclusions for unsupported public protocols are required. The default remains disabled.
Check List (For Author)
docs/private-rpc-tls.md.AI Disclosure